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 This is an appeal under the formal procedure, pursuant to 
G.L. c. 58A, § 7, and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal 
of the Board of Assessors of the City of Worcester 
(the “assessors” or the “appellee”) to abate taxes on a certain 
improved parcel of real estate located in the Worcester Airport 
Industrial Park at 170 Goddard Memorial Drive, in Worcester (the 
“subject property”), leased by and assessed to David P. Asmus 
(the “appellant”) under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal 
year 2013. 
 Commissioner Chmielinski heard this appeal.  Chairman 
Hammond and Commissioners Rose and Good joined him in the 
decision for the appellant.   
 These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a 
request by the appellee under G.L. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.   
 
 
 David P. Asmus, pro se, for the appellant. 
 
 John F. O’Day, Jr., Esq., Assistant City Solicitor, for the 
appellee.  
ATB 2017-180 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
The appellant presented his case-in-chief through his 
testimony and the introduction of two exhibits: (1) a written 
background statement authored by the appellant with supporting 
documentation; and (2) the Airport Industrial Park Lease (the 
“Lease”) applicable to the subject property, which, among other 
things, limits the use of the subject property to light 
manufacturing.
1
   
The assessors’ case-in-chief consisted of the testimony of 
Worcester’s Assessor, William Ford, which included his 
admissions that: (1) the city’s income-valuation analysis was 
premised on an office as opposed to a light manufacturing 
occupancy; (2) the configuration of the subject building did not 
easily support an office use; and (3) the Lease restricted the 
use of the subject property to light manufacturing.  The 
assessors also introduced the requisite jurisdictional 
documents, as well as: their property record and income-
valuation cards for the subject property; two listings for the 
subject property; and an undated description of the engineering 
services provided by the appellant’s company, Asmus Engineering 
Services, along with its mission and address at the subject 
                                                          
1 The appellant originally signed the Lease for Advanced Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc. as its President or authorized representative.  This 
entity was dissolved in 1991.  
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property.  Based on this evidence, the Appellate Tax Board (the 
“Board”) made the following findings of fact.   
On January 1, 2012, the valuation and assessment date for 
fiscal year 2013, the appellant was the long-term lessee and 
assessed owner of an 8.86-acre parcel of land situated in the 
Worcester Airport Industrial Park with an address of 170 Goddard 
Memorial Drive (the “subject parcel”).  At all relevant times, 
the subject parcel was improved with an approximately 10,000-
square-foot light manufacturing building (the “subject 
building”).  For assessment purposes, this property is 
identified on map 47 as block 18, parcel 0 (the parcel and 
building together comprise the “subject property”).   
For fiscal year 2013, the assessors valued the subject 
property at $797,500, and assessed tax thereon at the commercial 
rate of $30.85, in the amount of $24,602.87.  In accordance with 
G.L. c. 59, § 57C, the appellant timely paid the tax due without 
incurring interest.  In accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the 
appellant timely filed an abatement application on January 30, 
2013, which the assessors denied on April 1, 2013.  In 
accordance with G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, the appellant 
seasonably filed his appeal with this Board on June 2, 2013.
2
  On 
this basis, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction 
over this appeal. 
                                                          
2 The assessors, in accordance with G.L. c. 58A, § 7A, timely transferred the 
appellant’s informal appeal to the Board’s formal procedure.  
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As the appellant explained, in 1988, he was a professor at 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute and the Director of its Robotics 
Center.  In that same year, he started an independent venture 
business applying robotics to industrial applications.  To house 
this new venture, he secured a sixty-year lease from the City of 
Worcester for the subject parcel and built the subject building 
on it.  Shortly thereafter, the manufacturing sector experienced 
a significant downturn causing him to abandon his new business 
venture and obtain a more stable job in the private sector.  He 
then leased the subject building to the Central Massachusetts 
Special Educational Collaborative (the “Collaborative”) which 
used the subject building as an educational facility.   
In 2006, the Collaborative terminated its occupancy, and 
the appellant attempted to sell the subject building along with 
his leasehold interest in the subject parcel.  The appellant 
negotiated a purchase and sale agreement with a prospective 
purchaser who intended to use the subject property as a training 
center for autistic children.  The parties agreed upon a sale 
price of $675,000 and set a closing date.  In preparing for the 
closing, it came to light that Worcester had transferred its
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interest in the subject parcel and Lease to the Massachusetts 
Port Authority (“MassPort”).  When the appellant and prospective 
purchaser approached MassPort to approve the sale pursuant to 
the Lease, MassPort baulked because it ostensibly did not want 
children near the airport and because the Lease limits the use 
of the subject property to light manufacturing.   
The appellant then commenced discussions with MassPort for 
its purchase of the subject building and buy-out of the Lease 
for which MassPort offered $285,000 in October, 2013.  The 
appellant has continued to actively market the property through 
a licensed real estate broker with no success.  The broker 
confirmed that the light manufacturing restriction in the Lease, 
coupled with MassPort’s refusal to allow any other uses, as well 
as the design of the subject building renders the subject 
property “extremely difficult to sell or lease.” 
The assessors did not contradict or contest the appellant’s 
assertions with respect to the Lease restrictions, MassPort’s 
refusal to lift them, the negotiations between the appellant and 
MassPort, or the difficulty in selling or leasing a property so 
designed and encumbered.  The assessors acknowledged that in 
their income-capitalization methodology, they had valued the 
subject property under an office-use scenario as opposed to a 
light-manufacturing one, which resulted in a higher net income 
and lower capitalization rate than appropriate, thereby 
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overvaluing the subject property for the fiscal year 2013.  The 
property record card pertaining to the subject property 
indicates that the assessors had valued the subject building and 
the subject parcel at $678,600 and $118,900, respectively, for 
fiscal year 2013.                          
 Based on all the evidence, the Board ultimately found that 
the appellant met his burden of proving that the subject 
property was overvalued for the fiscal year at issue.  The Board 
found that the $285,000 offer from MassPort to purchase the 
subject building and remaining leasehold interest represented 
the best evidence of the subject building’s value for the fiscal 
year at issue and the assessed value attributed by the assessors 
to the subject parcel was the best evidence of its value for the 
fiscal year at issue.  The Board found that the assessors’ 
income-capitalization analysis was seriously flawed and resulted 
in an excessively high value for the subject property because it 
was premised on an incorrect highest and best use and did not 
account for certain lease restrictions on the subject property 
imposed and enforced by a governmental entity.  Moreover, 
neither party introduced evidence supporting an income-
capitalization approach premised on a light manufacturing use 
for the subject property.   
Under the circumstances, the Board determined that the best 
evidence of the subject property’s value for fiscal years at 
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issue was MassPort’s estimate of the subject building’s value 
and remaining leasehold quantified in its offer, in conjunction 
with the corresponding assessed value of subject parcel.  The 
Board therefore found and ruled that the value of the subject 
property was $403,900 for fiscal year 2013.  Accordingly, the 
Board decided this appeal for the appellant and abated 
$12,142.56 for fiscal year 2013.     
 
OPINION 
The assessors are required to assess real estate at its 
fair cash value as of the first day of January preceding the 
start of the fiscal year.  G.L. c. 59, §§ 2A and 38.  Fair cash 
value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a 
willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both are 
fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas v. Assessors 
of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).   
The appellants have the burden of proving that the property 
has a lower value than that assessed.  “̒The burden of proof is 
upon the petitioner to make out its right as [a] matter of law 
to [an] abatement of the tax.̓”  Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great 
Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974)(quoting Judson Freight 
Forwarding v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)).  “[T]he 
board is entitled to ‘presume that the valuation made by the 
assessors [is] valid unless the taxpayers . . . prov[e] the 
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contrary.’”  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 
393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984) (quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245).   
“Prior to valuing the subject property, its highest and 
best use must be ascertained, which has been defined as the use 
for which the property would bring the most.”  Tennessee Gas 
Pipeline Co. v. Assessors of Agawam, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact 
and Reports 2000-859, 875 (citing Conness v. Commonwealth, 
184 Mass. 541, 542-43 (1903); Irving Saunders Trust v. Assessors 
of Boston, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 838, 843 (1989)(and the cases cited 
therein).  In determining fair market value, all uses to which 
the property was or could reasonably be adapted on the relevant 
assessment date should be considered.  Newton Girl Scout 
Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 Mass. 
189, 193 (1956).  If a property is particularly well-suited for 
a certain use that is not prohibited, then that use may be 
reflected in an estimate of fair market value.  Colonial Acres 
v. North Reading, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 386 (1975).  According 
to the authoritative valuation treatise, APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE 
APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE (13
th
 ed. 2008), highest and best use is 
defined as “[t]he reasonably probable and legal use of vacant 
land . . . that is physically possible, appropriately supported, 
and financially feasible and that results in the highest value.”  
Id. at 277-78.     
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In the present appeal, the Board found and ruled that, for 
ad valorem tax purposes, the subject property’s highest and best 
use was as a light manufacturing facility.  The Lease with the 
City of Worcester and later, with MassPort, both governmental 
entities, still had over thirty years to run as of the relevant 
valuation and assessment date, and that Lease restricted the use 
of the subject property to light manufacturing.  See Kahn v. 
Assessors of Brookline, Mass. Appellate Tax Board Findings of 
Fact and Reports 2004-403, 441, citing Parkinson v. Assessors of 
Medfield, 398 Mass. 112, 116 (1986) (recognizing that government 
restrictions may impact a property’s value).  Any other use 
would, in the Board’s view, be highly speculative.  Moreover, 
the assessors acknowledged as much at trial.  
 Generally, real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts 
courts, and this Board rely upon three approaches to determine 
the fair cash value of property: income capitalization; sales 
comparison; and cost reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford 
Redevelopment Auth., 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).   However, 
“[t]he board is not required to adopt any particular method of 
valuation.”  Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 
397 Mass. 447, 449 (1986).   
Actual sales of the subject property generally “furnish 
strong evidence of market value, provided they are arm’s-length 
transactions and thus fairly represent what a buyer has been 
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willing to pay for the property to a willing seller.”  Foxboro 
Associates v. Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 682 
(1982); New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 
383 Mass. 456, 469 (1981); First National Stores, Inc. v. 
Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 560 (1971).  And while 
mere offers are generally not considered strong evidence of the 
value of a property because they only represent one party’s view 
of its value, where, as here, the market is so constrained that 
the only viable purchaser is the governmental entity imposing or 
enforcing the market restrictions, the Board considered the 
offer from that entity to be probative on fair cash value.  See 
THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE at 365 (“In addition to recorded sales 
and signed contracts, appraisers should consider . . . offers to 
purchase [even though] offers provide less reliable data than 
signed contracts and completed sales . . . [and] [o]ften the 
final sale price is . . . higher than the initial offer to 
buy.”).  The Board then added the assessed value of the land 
component to that offer, as the best evidence of the subject 
parcel’s value, because, in the Board’s view, the offer did not 
account for the full fee simple value of the subject property.         
Accordingly, the Board calculated the value of the subject 
property as follows: 
 Offer Land Assessment Fair Cash Value 
Fiscal Year 2013 $285,000 $118,900 $403,900 
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 In making its various findings and rulings in this appeal, 
the Board was not required to believe the testimony of any 
particular witness or to adopt any particular method of 
valuation suggested.  Rather, the Board could accept those 
portions of the evidence that the Board determined had more 
convincing weight. Foxboro Associates, 385 Mass. at 682; New 
Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 469.  “The credibility of 
witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence are matters for the board.”  Cummington 
School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 
597, 605 (1977). 
The Board applied these principles in reaching its ultimate 
finding and ruling that the appellant successfully demonstrated 
that the subject property was overvalued for the fiscal year at 
issue. On this basis, the Board decided this appeal for the 
appellant and abated $12,142.56 in real estate taxes. 
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